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Abstract
This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is
selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee
members dier in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also
dier in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for
the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically inecient and inertial
around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates
autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical ob-
servation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently
adjusted.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the dynamic implications of monetary policy making by committee. The
subject matter is important because, in many countries, monetary policy decisions are made
by committees, rather than by one individual alone. For example, Fry et al. (2000) report
that in a sample of 88 central banks, 79 use some form of committee structure to formulate
monetary policy.
In particular, this paper focuses on a two-person committee where heterogenous agents
must select the value of the policy instrument (say, the nominal interest rate) but face
exogenous uncertainty regarding their preferred policies in the future. The committee
members diger in two ways. First, agents have digerent state-dependent preferences over
policy. There are states of nature where agents do not agree in their preferred instrument
value, and states where they agree. Second, agents diger in their institutional role. More
concretely, one agent, the chairman or agenda setter, makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to
the other agent in every period. This assumption captures the idea that chairmen usually
have more power and inﬂuence than their peers as a result of additional legal responsibilities,
statutory prerogatives, or prestige. The identity of the chairman and the composition of
the committee are assumed to be ﬁxed over time. An important and plausible feature of
the voting game is that the instrument value decided in the previous meeting is the default
option in case the proposal is rejected in the current meeting. Hence, the current status
quo is a state variable.1
In this setup, the ﬁrst-best policy (that is, the state-contingent program that a benevolent
social planner would choose) prescribes the policy preferred by both agents in states of agree-
ment and optimal risk-sharing in states of disagreement. However, since the implementation
of this optimal plan requires commitment, it is not surprising that the politico-economic equi-
librium cannot implement the ﬁrst-best policy in the absence of a commitment technology.
Instead, the politico-economic equilibrium features inecient policy choices in all states of
nature. First, in states of agreement, committee members do not select their common pre-
ferred policy. The reason is that forward-looking policy makers realize that current decisions
agect future voting outcomes by changing the default option in the next meeting. Hence,
in choosing the current policy, committee members trade-og the beneﬁt of selecting their
preferred policy for this period and the cost of agecting their bargaining power in future
states of disagreement. Simulations show that this form of “political failure” (to borrow
1The theoretical literature on bargaining with evolving defaults is scant. Among the few contribution,
see Baron (1996), Baron and Herron (2003), and Bernheim et al. (2005). To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the ﬁrst to incorporate preference uncertainty in a model with dynamic reversion of the status quo.
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the term proposed by Besley and Coate, 1998) often implies muted responses to changing
economic conditions and, consequently, provides a rationale for policy conservatism.2
Second, in states of disagreement, committee decisions are inertial. That is, the chair-
man’s optimal proposal is often the status quo, even when the state of nature has changed.
This result is primarily due to the heterogeneity in policy preferences and to the role of
the status quo as the default option in the voting game. Since the default policy may not
undesirable for a committee member, in many instances policy changes are not passed (or
proposed). A similar status-quo bias in policy making is derived by Romer and Rosenthal
(1978) in a static model. However, compared to their agenda-setting game, the status-quo
bias in this model gives rise to ineciency. In particular, there is imperfect risk-sharing in
that there are instances where the current policy is (close to) optimal for one policy maker
but very costly for the other (or vise versa). Also, the status-quo bias in this model is not
as severe as in the game in Romer and Rosenthal. In some circumstances, the chairman is
able to change policy even if the default option coincides with the preferred policy of the
other member. This result arises because, in a dynamic setup, committee members smooth
their bargaining power across states and are willing to lower their current utility to increase
their bargaining power in future meetings.
The inertia in committee decision making predicted by this model is a plausible expla-
nation for the empirical observation that the interest rate under a central bank’s control is
infrequently adjusted despite the arrival of new information. Figure 1 plots the histogram of
the changes in the target value of the key interest rate in four central banks: the U.S. Federal
Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Canada.3 Note
that, by far, the most frequent policy decision is to leave the interest-rate target unchanged.
In addition, since the status quo is a state variable, current and lagged instrument values are
linked through the solution of the chairman’s dynamic optimization problem. Hence, this
model endogenously generates autocorrelation in key interest rates. In contrast, the stan-
dard model with a single central banker, which underlies the derivation of the Taylor rule,
predicts that the interest rate is always adjusted whenever economic conditions change and
2Other explanations for partial adjustment to shocks include policy maker uncertainty (Orphanides, 2003),
improved control over long-term interest rates (Goodfriend, 1991, and Woodford, 2003), and reduction of
ﬁnancial stress (Cukierman, 1991).
3The interest rates are the Federal Funds Rate, the Rate for Main Reﬁnancing Operations, the Repo Rate,
and the Overnight Rate, respectively. The samples used to construct these histograms start in August 1987,
January 1999, June 1997, and June 1997, respectively, and end in March 2005 in all cases. For the Federal
Reserve, the sample starts with the ﬁrst meeting under Alan Greenspan chairmanship, and the data sources
are Chappell et al. (2005) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. For the other central banks, the
sample starts (roughly) at the time when committee decision making was instituted, and the data were
collected by the authors using ocial press releases.
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does not predict interest rate autocorrelation.4 Since interest rates are serially correlated in
the data, lagged interest rates are usually appended to the Taylor rule in empirical work.
As a result of policy inertia, the policy variable in this model changes less often than
the state of nature and, consequently, the path of the former is smoother than that of the
latter. A similar result whereby committee decision making induces policy smoothing has
been derived by Waller (2000) in a model with partisan central bank appointments and
exogenous electoral outcomes a` la Alesina (1987). In our model, policy smoothing is not
sustained by the strategic appointment of moderate committee members (as in Waller’s
model) or by trigger punishments (as in Alesina’s model), but is instead the result of the
voting game played by the committee. Moreover, in the above literature, policy smoothing
is regarded as welfare increasing because it reduces the uncertainty associated with elections.
Thus, a constant policy rule, irrespective of the identity of the winning party, is beneﬁcial to
both parties. In our model, preferred policies are not constant but instead vary over time as
the state of nature changes. As a result, a constant policy is not optimal and policy inertia
moves the economy away from the ecient frontier.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the committee and solves a simple
two-state model that illustrates the main implications of the voting game. Section 3 solves
and simulates a more general multi-state model. Section 4 compares the voting model with
an endogenous and a ﬁxed default. Section 5 concludes.
2 Two-State Model
This section describes the committee and examines a version of the dynamic voting game
with two states of nature. The two-state model is solved for three horizons, namely T = 1, 2
and 4. The ﬁnite horizon cases (T = 1, 2) are solved analytically by backward induction
and the inﬁnite horizon case (T =4) is solved numerically. Studying the two-state model
ﬁrst helps develop the reader’s intuition by illustrating some of our results in the simplest
possible setup.
The committee is composed of two agents with heterogenous preferences: C and P, where
C is the ﬁxed chairman.5 In every period, the committee is concerned with selecting the
policy variable x that takes values in the interval [a, c] , with a < c. To make this more
4An exception is Woodford (2003) where a motive for interest-rate smoothing is explicitly introduced into
the central bank’s objective function.
5The assumption of a ﬁxed agenda setter is made for the sake of realism. For example, in the case of the
United States, the chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is (by tradition) the chairman of the
Board of Governors, who in turn is appointed by the President for a renewable four-year term. For models
of legislative bargaining where the the agenda setter is randomly selected, see Baron (1996) and Baron and
Ferjohn (1989).
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concrete, think of the policy variable as the target value of a key nominal interest rate. In
each period, the payog of policy maker j, for j = C,P , is
Uj(x, 0) = (x rj(0))2,
where rj(0) is j’s state-dependent preferred policy and 0 is an exogenous shock. For ana-
lytical convenience, it is assumed that the probability distribution of 0 is discrete. In this
section, it is also assumed that 0 can take only two values, 01 and 02. The shock follows
a Markov chain and its transition matrix has elements pki = prob(0k | 0i) 5 (0, 1) with
i, k = 1, 2 and
2P
k=1
pki = 1. Two states of nature are deﬁned by the possible realizations of
0. When 0 = 01, agents C and P disagree in their preferred instrument values, with c and
a their respective preferred points.6 When 0 = 02, C and P agree and b 5 (a, c) is their
preferred point. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the bliss points are evenly
spaced, meaning that b a = c b.
Each committee member ranks policy sequences according to the expected utility they
deliver. The intertemporal utility of member j is
E
Ã
TX
t=1
Bt31Uj(xt, 0t)
!
,
where B 5 (0, 1) is the discount factor, which is the same for both players. Note that
preferences depend on the policy instrument rather than on policy outcomes (say, inﬂation
and unemployment). This approach has two advantages. First, it makes the voting game
more tractable because otherwise the private sector’s expectations would be a state variable
that has to be validated in a rational expectations equilibrium.7 Second, it means that the
particular economic model that the policy maker believes to be true need not be speciﬁed.
This is important because anecdotal evidence suggests that policy makers may have diger-
ent views about how the economy works depending on their background and intellectual
environment. For example, Hetzel (1998) argues that Arthur Burns, the chairman of the
U.S. Federal Reserve from February 1970 to January 1978, attached signiﬁcant importance
to nonmonetary factors (e.g., business optimism and wage demands by unions) in the deter-
mination of inﬂation, and did not consider monetary policy to be the driving force behind
6The converse assumption — that C and P ’s preferred points are a and c, respectively — leads to decision
rules that are mirror images of the ones derived here. Hence, the main theoretical implications of the model
are robust to using either version of this assumption.
7This is a non-trivial ﬁxed point to solve for. The strategy of the private sector depends on the expected
voting outcome, but the outcome of the voting game depends on the expectations of the private sector in two
ways: 1) directly, because expected inﬂation aects policy makers’ utilities; and 2) indirectly by changing
the default payo, since the real interest rate in case of disagreement is the dierence between the nominal
status quo policy and expected inﬂation. For now, we leave this extension to future research.
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the rise in U.S. inﬂation in the 1970s. The actions of Paul Volcker as chairman from August
1979 to August 1987 suggests that he did not completely share Burns’ views on the causes of
inﬂation. Furthermore, committee members serving under the same chairman may disagree
on the “correct” economic model. For example, Chappell et al. (2005, ch. 6.3) document
the division within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) between Keynesian and
Monetarist members during Burns’ chairmanship.
Before discussing how the committee makes decisions, we derive the benchmark ﬁrst-best.
Let xWi denote the optimal policy when the state of nature i has occurred, with i = 1, 2. The
ﬁrst-best (xW1, x
W
2) is given by (x, b), where x is any policy in the interval [a, c]. The fact that
xW2 = b is obvious. To see that x
W
1 can be any instrument value in the interval [a, c], recall
that members’ preferences are opposite when 0 = 01 takes place and, consequently, it is not
possible to Pareto-improve upon any x 5 [a, c].
The committee decides policies sequentially with the following timing. First, the current
realization of the shock 0 is observed. Then, the chairman makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal
x 5 [a, c] . If the proposal is rejected by P , then the status quo persists until the next period.
If the proposal is accepted, then x is implemented and becomes the new status quo for the
voting game in the next period. The assumption that the chairman makes take-it-or-leave-
it proposals to the committee is not meant to be a literal description of how monetary
committees actually work. Instead, it is a modeling device that captures the idea that
chairmen usually have more power and inﬂuence than their peers.8
Mathematically, the problem of the chairman can be formulated recursively with state
given by the initial status quo and the current shock. The Markov strategies of the two
agents are deﬁned as follows. The proposal strategy of the chairman is
GC,t : [a, c]× {01, 02}$ [a, c] .
The voting rule followed by P depends on both the state and the proposal made by C,
GP,t : [a, c]× {01, 02} × [a, c]$ {yes, no} .
In the inﬁnite-horizon game, player’s strategies will be stationary. The voting rule is assumed
to be sequentially rational. That is, P votes in favor of the proposal whenever the current
utility from the proposal plus the continuation value of moving to the next period with a
8On the account of his experience as Board governor from 1996 to 2002, Laurence Meyer (Meyer, 2004)
remarks on “the chairman’s disproportionate inﬂuence on FOMC decisions” and on “his eorts to build
consensus around his policy recommendations” (p. 50). However, Mayer also notes that the chairman “does
not necessarily always get his way” (p. 52). Sherman Maisel, who was member of the Board during Burns’
chairmanship also points out that “while the inﬂuence of the Chairman is indeed great, he does not make
policy alone” (Maisel, 1973, p. 124).
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new status quo is higher than or equal to keeping the status quo and moving to the next
period with the current status quo. Deﬁne the acceptance set At as the set of policies that
are acceptable by P at time t, for a given default policy and a given realization of the state
of nature. More formally,
At(q, 0i) =
(
x 5 [a, c] : UP (x, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVP,t+1(x, 0k)  UP (q, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVP,t+1(q, 0k)
)
,
where the sum term is the conditional expectation of the value function VP,t+1(., 0) as of
time t. Note that unanimity is required for a policy change only because we are considering
a two-person committee. Appendix A shows that our setup is equivalent to a committee
with n+1 representatives where P occupies the role of the median and a simple majority is
required to pass a proposal.
Let q 5 [a, c] denote the initial status quo. For all t the proposal strategy GC,t(q, 0i)
solves the dynamic programming problem
VC,t(q, 0i) = max
xMAt(q,0i)
Ã
UC(x, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVC,t+1(x, 0k)
!
.
In words, C proposes the policy x that maximizes his utility from among those that are
acceptable to P . In the noncooperative bargaining environment studied here, the chairman’s
proposals are never rejected in equilibrium.9 The latter implication is in line with historical
records from the FOMC which show that a chairman’s recommendation has never been voted
down by the committee (see, Chappell et al., 2005).
The Markov perfect equilibrium of this game is a set of policy rules {GC,t, GP,t}Tt=1 , such
that: 1) for all t the voting rule GP,t is sequentially rational given {GP,s}Ts=t+1 and {GC,s}Ts=t ;
and 2) for all t the proposal rule GC,t solves the problem of the agenda setter at time t, given
{GC,s}Ts=t+1 and {GP,s}Ts=t.
2.1 Finite Horizon with T=1
Consider the voting game described above with ﬁnite horizon T = 1. Absent any dynamics,
the solution is similar to that of the agenda-setting game studied by Romer and Rosenthal
(1978). The chairman’s proposal strategy is depicted in the ﬁrst column of Figure 2 as a
function of the status quo q for each possible realization of 0. Proposals on the 45 degree
line are the status quo.
9Note that proposing a policy outside the acceptance set is equivalent to proposing the status quo, which
is always accepted.
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First, suppose that 01 occurs. In this case, the chairman proposes the status quo for
any q 5 [a, c] . The reason is that P would not accept any proposal x 5 (q, c] that gives C
higher utility than q, and C would not propose any x 5 [a, q) that gives him lower utility
than q. Since the proposal strategy is independent of the values of B, p11 and p22, it follows
that policy inertia arises in this case only as a result of the heterogeneity among committee
members. Now, suppose that 02 occurs and both members agree that b is the optimal value
of the policy instrument. In this case, the chairman proposes b starting from any status
quo. Notice that the outcome of this (static) game coincides with the ﬁrst-best.
2.2 Finite Horizon with T=2
Suppose now that the horizon is T = 2. The model is solved backwards for t = T, T  1.
The proposal strategies at time t = T are the ones derived in Section 2.1. The proposal
strategies at time T 1 are derived in Proposition 1 below. In order to develop the reader’s
intuition, these strategies are depicted in the second column of Figure 2 in the special case
where B = 0.5, p11 = 0.8 and p22 = 0.5. These probabilities correspond approximately to
those computed using the voting records of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the
Bank of England from June 1997 to January 2005.10
Proposition 1. Let T = 2. For all q 5 [a, c] the proposal rules at time T  1 when 01 and
02 occur are, respectively, GC,T31(q, 01) = q and
GC,T31(q, 02) =
;
AA?
AA=
y, for q 5 [a, 2z  y], where y = (b+ cBp12)/(1 + Bp12),
2z  q, for q 5 (2z  y, z), where z = (b+ aBp12)/(1 + Bp12),
q, for q 5 [z, y],
y, for q 5 (y, c].
.
Proof: We start by showing that GC,T31(q, 01) = q is the optimal proposal rule. Suppose
that the current shock is 01. The chairman’s proposal strategy at time t = T  1 is found
by exploiting the fact that the successful proposal in T will be given by the proposal rules
in Section 2.1. The chairman chooses the proposal x that maximizes his two-period payog
10The voting records contain information on: the date of the meeting; the policy decision; the names of
members in favor of the decision; and the names and preferred policy options of dissenting members. The
probabilities are computed as follows. A meeting where the policy decision is adopted unanimously is treated
as one where all committee members agree in their preferred instrument value, meaning that in terms of our
model % = %2. A meeting with at least one dissenting individual is treated as one where committee members
disagree in their preferred instrument value, meaning that % = %1. Then, p11 (p22) is computed as the
number of observations where members disagree (agree) in two consecutive meetings divided by the number
of observations where members disagree (agree) in the ﬁrst of these two meetings. Since the mapping from
the voting records to the model is clearly imperfect, the policy rules in Figure 2 are best interpreted as
illustrative only.
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within the acceptance set, AT31(q, 01). That is, he solves the following problem:
max
xMAT31(q,01)
 (1 + Bp11) (x c)2,
where the acceptance set is deﬁned as
AT31(q, 01) =
©
x 5 [a, c] : (1 + Bp11)(x a)2  (1 + Bp11)(q  a)2
ª
.
It is easy to see that the acceptance set is [a, q] for any q 5 [a, c]. Since C’s two-period
payog is increasing in the current proposal, the chairman always proposes x = q.
Now we prove that the posited GC,T31(q, 02) is optimal. When 02 occurs at time T  1,
the chairman’s problem becomes:
max
xMAT31(q,02)
(x b)2  Bp12(x c)2,
where
AT31(q, 02) =
©
x 5 [a, c] : (x b)2  Bp12(x a)2  (q  b)2  Bp12(q  a)2
ª
.
In ﬁnding GC,T31(q, 02), it is useful to ﬁrst derive P ’s voting rules. P ’s two-period utility is
concave in x, with a maximum at
z =
b+ aBp12
1 + Bp12
.
Note that a < z < b. Because the payog is symmetric around z, the acceptance set is easy
to derive. For any q 5 [a, z] , AT31(q, 02) = [q, 2z  q] , and for any q 5 [z, c] , AT31(q, 02) =
[2z  q, q] . Now consider C’s proposal strategy. C’s objective function is concave and has
a global maximum at
y =
b+ cBp12
1 + Bp12
.
Note that b < y < c. When q 5 [y, c] , C is not constrained and will propose y. When
q 5 (2zy, y), C is constrained and proposes his preferred policy in the acceptance set. We
distinguish two cases: when q 5 [z, y), the proposal is x = q, and when q 5 (2z  y, z), the
proposal is x = 2z  q. Finally, when q 5 [a, 2z  y], the acceptance set includes C’s bliss
point y and, consequently, C proposes x = y. ¥
Note that the decision rules in period T  1 converge to those in period T as B $ 0
(committee members attach no weight to future payogs) or p11, p22 $ 1 (the states of nature
are absorbing): in either case y, z $ b.
We now comment on the policy rules just derived. When 01 occurs and committee
members disagree on the optimal instrument value, the proposal at time T1 is q, irrespective
[8]
of the current status quo. The status-quo bias originates from the opposite preferences of
the two players. In this case, there is no Pareto-improving policy change and the political
equilibrium is ecient according to the standard economic deﬁnition. To see this, pick any
q 5 [a, c] and note that any policy choice to the right (left) of q would reduce P ’s (C’s)
utility. Thus, for the two-state model, the committee implements the ﬁrst-best in the state
of disagreement.11
When 02 occurs and committee members agree that b is the optimal instrument value
today, Proposition 1 shows that the proposal at time T  1 is generically digerent from the
ﬁrst-best policy b. For example, when q 5 [y, c] , C adjusts the current policy only to y,
which is larger than b. This result is due to the non-zero probability of disagreement in the
next meeting: the chairman trades og the beneﬁt of moving towards the ideal point b and
the cost of weakening his bargaining power should 0 = 01 in the next period.
To verify the existence of a political failure in equilibrium, consider, for instance, the
case where q = y. Rather than staying in y, as established in Proposition 1, a Pareto-
improving choice would be moving to b today and going back to y in the next period should
01 occur. However, this policy requires commitment. Absent commitment, after the
default policy has changed to b, it is not sequentially rational for P to allow C to return to
y. Consequently, a policy change to b will not be implemented by the committee.12 Similar
polices that Pareto-improve upon those in Proposition 1 can be constructed for all status quo
in [a, c] except for {b, 2z  b} . (In these two cases, committee decision making implements
the ﬁrst-best because the proposal coincides with b.) Hence, this simple two-state, two-
period model illustrates the fact that, in some circumstances, committee decision making
with an endogenous status quo is inecient; responses to shocks are more muted compared
to situations where there is a single central banker. Since y is increasing in p12 and B,
the chairman becomes more cautious as the conditional probability of future disagreement
increases and as the future is discounted less heavily by committee members.
While it is dicult to obtain a complete characterization of the proposal rule for an
arbitrary period T  s, where s denotes the number of remaining periods until T, the result
of partial adjustment carries over as T increases. Suppose the status quo at time T  s is
equal to c. We can show that the committee does not move when 01 occurs and moves to
11Section 3 below shows that this result is not robust to increasing the number of shock realizations and,
consequently, in the multi-state version of the model, the politico-economic equilibrium is inecient in all
states.
12This model abstracts from sunset proposals, that is proposals over more than one period. However, if
sunset proposals are allowed while keeping the assumption that the default in the next meeting is the status
quo, then our results would be unchanged.
[9]
vT3s when 02 occurs, where vT3s is deﬁned as
vT3s =
b+ cBp12
sP
j=1
(Bp11)j31
1 + Bp12
sP
j=i
(Bp11)j31
, 1  s  T  1.
Note that vT3s = y in the special case where T = 2 and s = 1. If repeated realizations
of 0 = 02 take place, the committee moves gradually towards y > b. To see this, note that
the sequence {vT3s}T31s=1 is increasing in s and converges to y as the economy approaches the
previous-to-last period. Intuitively, at time T  s  1, the chairman is more cautious in
moving towards y than at T  s because he is more likely to be constrained as a result of
the current choice when there are more periods left before the end of the game. Note that
today’s decision has an egect on future outcomes only when 01 occurs in the next period,
two periods in a row, three periods in a row, etc.13 However, when there are more periods
left before the end of the game, the sum of the probabilities associated with these events is
quantitatively larger.
2.3 Inﬁnite Horizon
Consider now the voting game in the case where the horizon is inﬁnite. Because ﬁnding the
analytical solution to the inﬁnite-horizon game is not trivial, we employ instead a numerical
algorithm to ﬁnd the stationary decision rules. The procedure builds on the projection
method employed by Judd (1998) to study the Bellman equation of the stochastic growth
model, and works by backward induction exploiting the observation that the chairman’s
problem is a constrained maximization which can be solved numerically using standard hill-
climbing methods. See Appendix B for a detailed description of the algorithm.
The chairman’s stationary decision rules are plotted in the third column of Figure 2.
When 0 = 01 and both members disagree, the chairman simply proposes the status quo.
When 0 = 02, the proposal strategy is qualitatively similar to that derived analytically in
Proposition 1 for the horizon T = 2, but the digerence between the proposed policy and the
current bliss point is larger. This result follows from the observation that vT3s decreases as
s$4. In particular,
lim
s<"
vT3s = v =
b+ cBp12/(1 Bp11)
1 + Bp12/(1 Bp11)
>
b+ cBp12
1 + Bp12
= y > b.
13For example, if %1 occurs in the next period and %2 in two periods from now, the payo two periods
from now is not aected by the current decision because two periods from now the chairman will not be
constrained and can move to his bliss point.
[10]
Finally, since vw > y z (see Figure 2), the set of status quo for which the chairman does
not propose a policy change is larger in the inﬁnite horizon case.
3 Multi-State Model
This section solves the dynamic voting game in the more general case where the number of
possible shock realizations is larger than two. This extension is important for two reasons.
First, it shows that the ecient outcome in the state of disagreement reported in Section 2
is not robust to increasing the number of shock realizations and, consequently, committee
policy choices may be inecient in all states. Second, the two-state model features a strong
form of policy inertia in the form of the absorbing region [w, v] and, consequently, it does
not permit the derivation of time series implications.14 In what follows, the chairman’s
proposal strategies are computed, and then policy decisions by the committee are simulated
for a sample of sequential meetings.
3.1 Proposal Strategies
Assume that the shock 0 can take I discrete values, 0i for i = 1, 2, . . . , I. Deﬁne S =
{01, 02, . . . , 0I}. As before, the shock follows a Markov chain and its I × I transition matrix
has elements pki = prob(0k | 0i) 5 (0, 1) that satisfy
IP
k=1
pki = 1. The shock 0 shifts the
agents’ preferred policies over a policy set denoted by X. The timing and other features of
the model are as described in Section 2. For this more general speciﬁcation, the Markov
strategies of the two agents are deﬁned by
GC,t : X × S $ X,
GP,t : X × S ×X $ {yes, no} .
The chairman’s proposal strategy GC,t(q, 0i) solves the dynamic programming problem
VC,t(q, 0i) = max
xMAt(q,0i)
UC(x, 0i) + BEtVC,t+1(x, 0),
where Et denotes the conditional expectation at time t and the acceptance set is deﬁned as
At(q, 0i) = {x 5 X : UP (x, 0i) + BEtVP,t+1(x, 0)  UP (q, 0i) + BEtVP,t+1(q, 0)} .
For concreteness, we focus on the case where I = 6 and maintain the convention that
committee members agree in the even states and disagree in the odd states of nature. The
14To see this, note that as soon as %2 occurs, the successful proposal will be x 5 [w, v] with x = q 5 [w, v]
thereafter.
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bliss points of P (C) in states 1 through 6 are, respectively, a(c), b(b), b(d), c(c), c(e), and
d(d), where a < b < c < d < e and are equally spaced. The policy set is the interval [a, e].
Stationary decision rules are solved for using the algorithm described in Section 2.3.
In what follows, we characterize the ﬁrst-best policy for the multi-state version of the
model. As before, xWi denotes the ﬁrst-best policy when shock i occurs, with i = 1, ..., 6.
Clearly, xW2 = b, x
W
4 = c, and x
W
6 = d. Regarding the optimal policies in the odd states, the
following risk-sharing conditions must hold:
U 0P (x
W
i , 0i)
U 0C(x
W
i , 0i)
= V, for i = 1, 3, 5,
where V < 0 is a constant. That is, the ratio of marginal utilities is equalized across all
states of disagreement. For the functional form of the payog function used here,
xW1  a
xW1  c
=
xW3  b
xW3  d
=
xW5  c
xW5  e
= V.
From this condition it follows that xW1  a = xW3  b = xW5  c, where a  xW1  c, b  xW3  d,
and c  xW5  e. To see, for example, that xW1  a = xW3  b, suppose, on the contrary, that
xW1a > xW3b (xW1a < xW3b) and note that in this case both policy makers could augment
their payog by lowering (increasing) xW1 and increasing (decreasing) xW3.
Since the chairman’s proposal strategies depend on the matrix of transition probabilities,
we conducted extensive experiments with various parameter conﬁgurations and report below
results for B = 0.5 and the transition matrices15
A =
5
9999997
3/5 1/5 0 0 0 0
1/5 3/5 1/5 0 0 0
1/5 1/5 3/5 1/5 0 0
0 0 1/5 3/5 1/5 1/5
0 0 0 1/5 3/5 1/5
0 0 0 0 1/5 3/5
6
::::::8
and B =
5
9999997
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
6
::::::8
.
Matrix A was deliberately designed to represent the idea that preferred policies evolve slowly
over time as new information about business cycle and inﬂation variables becomes available.
Matrix B is used to show that: 1) committee decision making can generate endogenous
autocorrelation in the policy variable even when the states of nature are not autocorrelated;
and 2) overshooting may be an outcome of the voting model. Decision rules are respectively
plotted in the ﬁrst and second column of Figure 3. Proposals on the 45 degree line are the
status quo (that is, x = q).
15The relatively low value of  is used to show that dynamic ineciency arises in the multi-state version
of the model even when the future is heavily discounted. Alesina (1987) argues that policy makers’ eective
discount rates may be low because reappointment probabilities are less than one. Results from unreported
experiments are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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The following implications for committee decision making can be drawn from Figure 3.
First, consider the proposal rules in states of agreement. As before, the chairman proposes
instrument values digerent from b, c and d in states 2, 4 and 6, respectively, even though
both members agree that these are their current preferred policy options. The intuition for
this result is the same as in the two-state model, namely that in a dynamic setup, committee
members face a trade-og between the current beneﬁt of choosing their preferred policy and
the possible cost of reducing their bargaining power in future meetings. In most cases,
the committee partially adjust to shocks that align preferences and, consequently, policy
changes are typically smaller than the optimal ones. While policy conservatism is by far
the most common outcome, overshooting may arise when drastic changes in the preferred
policies are allowed. By overshooting, we refer to the situation where the committee changes
the instrument value by more than a single central banker would. Then, policy changes
are larger than the optimal ones. An example of overshooting under the transition matrix
B is the following. Starting in state 0 = 02 and with a status quo larger than b, note
that the chairman proposes a policy less than b, while the single central banker would have
adopted b.16 Note that, like partial adjustment, overshooting is also inecient because both
committee members would increase their current payog by choosing the instrument value
they currently prefer.
Now consider the proposal rules in states of disagreement. In these cases, there is local
policy inertia around previously agreed on decisions. To see this, consider the following
example. Starting from state 0 = 02 and instrument value b, suppose there is a “small”
change in the state of nature, meaning to either of the adjacent states 0 = 01 or 03. In these
states, members disagree on their preferred instrument value but the chairman’s decision
rule still implies x = b. Now, suppose there is a “large” change in the state of nature,
meaning to 0 = 04, 05 or 06. Note that in these cases the proposal will be digerent from
the status quo regardless of whether members agree in their desired instrument value or
not. An implication of local inertia is that the relation between changes in the state of
nature and in policy is nonlinear. In particular, small changes in the state of nature are
less likely to produce policy changes compared with larger ones. Empirically, this would
mean, for example, that small variations in the rates of inﬂation and unemployment are less
likely to result in a change in the key nominal interest rate, compared with large movements
16The reason why we observe overshooting with matrix B, but not with matrix A, is the following. The
rationale for overshooting and proposing a policy less than b is to have more leverage should % = %5 occur
and get closer to the ideal point e. The cost of overshooting is that the chairman is worse o if shock %1
occurs, because the agenda setter is stuck with a policy lower than b, when his ideal instrument value is c.
Since p52 = 0 in matrix A, the expected cost of overshooting is larger, and, consequently, overshooting does
not occur in equilibrium.
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in these variables.17 In contrast, the standard model with a single central banker, which
underlies the derivation of the linear Taylor rule, predicts a proportional change in the policy
instrument for any change in inﬂation and unemployment regardless of their size.
Note that P allows a policy change in the (odd) states of nature where there is disagree-
ment, even when the current default coincides with his preferred policy. For example, when
q = a and 0 = 01 occurs, the committee chooses an instrument value closer to c. When the
default coincides with his preferred policy, P has signiﬁcant bargaining power in the current
period and, consequently, is willing to accept a policy change to increase his bargaining
power in future meetings.18 This result is not present in the static agenda-setting game of
Romer and Rosenthal (1978). It can only be obtained in a dynamic setup where agents have
an incentive to smooth their bargaining power across states by choosing the default for the
next meeting. This opportunity is valuable because agents are risk-averse. In absence of
commitment, agents strategically modify the (endogenous) default in order to better share
risk across states. Clearly, this instrument is imperfect: compared to what is prescribed
by the ﬁrst-best, risk-sharing is not optimal (i.e., the politico-economic equilibrium fails to
satisfy the eciency condition in states of disagreement as well). In some states, one of the
two policy makers obtains a high payog while the other sugers a large loss; in some other
states, the situation may be reversed. Consequently, there is room for better risk-sharing
among committee members.
3.2 Simulations
This section simulates committee decision making using an artiﬁcial sample of sequential
meetings under the multi-state voting model examined above. This exercise is important
because it reveals the proposal strategies that are implemented in practice and permits the
derivation of time series implications.
A series of 200 realizations of the shock 0 were generated using each transition probability
matrix (whether A or B). Then, the outcome of the voting game was found using the
chairman’s proposal strategies in Figure 3. The simulated series of 0 and x are plotted
in Figure 4. Notice that there is policy smoothing in the sense that the policy variable
changes less often than the state of nature. That is, there are many instances where nature
changes but the value of the policy variable remains the same. Earlier research by Alesina
17Eijnger, Schaling and Verhagen (1999) construct a model for a single central banker that generates a
similar prediction in the form of an inaction range around the previous policy choice, but inertia is the result
of an unspeciﬁed ﬁxed cost for policy changes.
18Returning to the previous example, notice that were policy a to remain the default and should % = %5
occur next period, P would enter the next meeting with very low bargaining power.
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(1987) and Waller (2000) also ﬁnds that policy may display less variance when decisions
are made through committees than when they are made by a single individual. However,
in this model, policy smoothing is not sustained by the strategic appointment of moderate
committee members (as in Waller’s model) or by trigger punishments (as in Alesina’s model),
but by the voting game played by the heterogenous committee. Also, notice that the
ergodic process of the policy variable involves a ﬁnite number of realizations but they do not
correspond to the agreement values (b, c, and d) because of dynamic ineciency.
From the simulated series, it is possible to construct the frequency histograms for {x
in Figure 5.19 From this Figure, it is clear that the most common policy decision by
the committee is to set {x = 0 despite the fact that the state of nature has changed.20
This result is due to the local inertia implied by the optimal decision rules of committee
members which was discussed above. Thus, the voting model can provide an explanation
for the observation in Figure 1 whereby the interest rate under the central bank’s control is
infrequently adjusted, despite the fact that there is new information.
It is important to compare this implication with the one obtained when monetary policy
is determined by a single individual, say C. Absent a committee, C’s decision rule involves
changing the policy variable to his preferred value whenever there is a change in the state of
nature. The histograms for this case are plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 5 and show
that, in contrast with the data, the outcome {x = 0 is relatively infrequent.
Figure 6 plots the sample autocorrelation of the policy variable in the model and in
the key interest rate from four central banks. First, note that the model endogenously
generates positive autocorrelation in the policy variable even when the states of nature are
not serially correlated (Matrix B). Second, when the states of nature are persistent (Matrix
A), then the predicted autocorrelation may approach that observed in actual data.21 Instead,
the standard model with a single central banker used to derive the Taylor rule does not
predict interest rate autocorrelation. Since interest rates are autocorrelated in the data, the
empirical analysis of Taylor rules usually involves the addition of lagged interest rates to the
theoretical relation (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999).
19In order to get a more accurate picture of the distribution, these histograms were constructed using
simulations of 10000 observations.
20Because the transition matrix has a built-in inertia when the diagonal elements are non-zero and in
order not to overstate the policy inertia predicted by the voting game, the histograms are plotted using only
observations where there is a change in the state of nature.
21English et al. (2003) reports evidence that the autocorrelation in the U.S. Federal Funds Rate is the
result of both policy inertia and shock persistence.
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4 Comparing Monetary Policy Institutions
This paper shows the existence of a political failure in monetary policy making by com-
mittee. However, the fact that a ﬁctional social planner can improve upon committees is
no reason to conclude that this institutional arrangement is inecient. In the real world,
the only fair comparison is among political equilibria that can be obtained in the class of
available institutions.22 In order to conclude that a given institution is inecient, one must
show that there exists another institution that increases the utilities of both policy makers.
Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered in a deﬁnitive way because, for obvious
reasons, the set of feasible institutions cannot be fully characterized.
In this section, we consider an alternative institutional arrangement that is identical to the
one we have discussed so far, except for the fact that the default policy is ﬁxed. This shuts
down the dynamic link between periods and eliminates the rationale for not implementing
the preferred policy in the even states of nature. Figure 7 shows the stationary policy rules
when the default is either of the bliss points a through e. These policy rules do not depend
on either the status quo or the matrix of transition probabilities. That is, when plotted as
a function of q, they are horizontal lines and are the same for any transition matrix. The
optimal proposal in the even states of nature is the preferred bliss point for any ﬁxed default,
but in the odd states it crucially depends on the location of the default. Table 1 reports
the ex-ante (average) payog for each committee member under three alternative institutions:
1) a committee with an evolving default; 2) a committee with a ﬁxed default; and 3) full
delegation to C.23
Table 1 shows that a redistribution of utilities across members is obtained by varying the
ﬁxed default. Note that the “average” preferred policies in the states of disagreement for
P and C are, respectively, b and d. This is why P (C) obtains a high payog when b (d) is
the ﬁxed default. However, the best ﬁxed default for the chairman is policy e. The reason
is that this default always gives P a lower payog than C’s ideal point. Thus, the chairman
has enough bargaining power to propose his preferred point in all states of nature. Having
a committee with a ﬁxed default at e is therefore equivalent to an institution where C is
the single central banker (see the last column in Table 1). Note that while having a ﬁxed
default eliminates the dynamic ineciency in the states of agreement, it does not implement
the ecient outcome in the states of disagreement. To see this, suppose, for example, that
22For a discussion along the same lines, see Besley and Coate (1998, Section IV).
23This comparison is meant to be suggestive only. The stylized nature of the model developed here
prevents us from assessing more in detail the potential social welfare implications of committee decision-
making, as well as the empirical relevance of dynamic ineciency. We intend to take up these issues in
future work.
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the ﬁxed default is c. Then, the committee selects c whenever 0 = 01 or 0 = 05 occur. This
outcome is clearly inecient because the utility of both committee members would increase
by choosing a policy between the values preferred by P and C. In other words, there is
inecient risk sharing between P and C when the default is ﬁxed. This source of ineciency
is also present in the model with an endogenous default, but it is less severe. The reason
is that, when the default is endogenous, committee members can smooth their bargaining
power across states of natures and, consequently, insure themselves against the eventuality
of having little bargaining power in the next meeting.
Now, compare the average payogs under committees with endogenous and ﬁxed defaults.
Clearly, an endogenous default lowers the average payog to both members in the even states
compared with a ﬁxed default because the policy preferred by both members is not imple-
mented. However, Table 1 shows that starting with an endogenous default, the committee
would not agree on amending the institution because any choice of ﬁxed default would lower
the ex-ante utility of one of the policy makers. Table 1 also shows that, when the default is
endogenous, C obtains a larger share of the surplus when the transition matrix is B rather
than A. This is so because the optimal policy changes more drastically when shocks follow
matrix B. Since the preferred policy in each period is more likely to be far from the previous
policy, the chairman has more leverage in proposing his preferred instrument value.
Regarding the variance of policy decisions under these institutions, note that a committee
with an endogenous status quo generally lowers the variance of both x and {x compared
with a single central banker and a committee with a ﬁxed default (except when the default
is c). This result is a consequence of the local policy inertia introduced by the endogenous
status quo.
The absence of an institution that Pareto-dominates an arrangement with an endogenous
default can explain its endurance, but it cannot explain why this institutional feature is
observed so often in practice.24 To answer this question, Riboni (2004) shows that, in a
model without uncertainty, an endogenous default works as a commitment device and makes
credibility problems less severe.
5 Summary
This paper models monetary policy making as a dynamic non-cooperative game. Committee
members sequentially decide the policy for the period after observing the current realization
of a preference shock. Depending on the shock, policy makers may agree or disagree about
24On this point, see Tsebelis (2002, p. 8). Rasch (2000) identiﬁes countries where an evolving default is
part of the formal rules in legislative decision making.
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the optimal monetary stance for the period. In this model, the ﬁrst-best policy can be
easily characterized: it satisﬁes a risk-sharing condition in the states of disagreement and
prescribes the preferred policy of both agents in the states of agreement. This paper shows
that, in the absence of commitment, committee decision making does not implement the
ﬁrst-best. Ineciencies arise in all states of nature. In states of agreement, policy makers
do not choose the policy they both currently prefer, because they face a trade-og between the
beneﬁt of selecting their preferred policy in the current period and the cost of reducing their
bargaining power in the future. In states of disagreement, ineciency is due to incomplete
risk-sharing between committee members. Stochastic simulations show that committee
decision making 1) induces policy smoothing in the sense that the policy variable changes
less often than the state of nature and 2) endogenously generates autocorrelation in interest
rates. Finally, we analyze committee decision making with a ﬁxed default and show that
this alternative arrangement removes the ineciency in states of agreement by eliminating
the incentive to smooth bargaining power across states. However, compared to a model with
endogenous default, a ﬁxed default model delivers more inecient risk-sharing in the states
of disagreement. This may be a probable reason why, despite the ineciencies described,
policy making in practice often features an evolving default.
Finally, we emphasize that this paper does not intend to play down the advantages of
policy making by committees. We recognize that committee decision making has many
desirable attributes. First, previous works show that committees can help overcome cred-
ibility problems. Sibert (2003) studies the conditions under which committees have more
incentives to build reputation than do individual central bankers. In Dal Bo´ (2005), com-
mittee decision making under a supermajority voting rule is able to deliver an ideal balance
between commitment and ﬂexibility. Second, another body of literature sees information
sharing as the main rationale for committee decision making. This argument goes back to
the celebrated Condorcet jury theorem. For example, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) shows that in
presence of uncertainty about potential output, voting by committees leads to more ecient
signal extraction. Experimental studies by Blinder and Morgan (2000) and Lombardelli et
al. (2005) provide some support for this conclusion.
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Table 1. Comparison of Voting Models
with Endogenous and Fixed Default
Fixed Single
Variable Endogenous a b c d e Banker
Matrix A
C’s mean payog 0.85 0.59 1.23 0.92 0.17 0 0
P ’s mean payog 0.51 0.92 0.26 0.59 1.48 1.99 1.99
V ar(x) 0.58 1.13 0.83 0.50 0.75 0.96 0.96
V ar({x) 0.27 0.78 0.45 0.44 0.77 0.95 0.95
Matrix B
C’s mean payog 0.68 0.82 1.00 0.83 0.17 0 0
P ’s mean payog 1.05 0.83 0.33 0.82 1.49 1.99 1.99
V ar(x) 0.75 1.29 0.90 0.58 0.75 0.96 .96
V ar({x) 0.88 1.82 1.27 0.82 1.05 1.35 1.35
Notes: The numbers in this Table were computed using 10000 simulations.
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A Committee with n+1 Members
Consider a committee composed of n + 1 members. Let n be odd and [x, x] denote the
policy space where policies take value. For a policy change, the chairman needs (n+ 1)/2
favorable votes besides his own. Each member other than the chairman is indexed by j, with
j 5 N = {1, ..., n}. When 0 = 01, members disagree in their preferred instrument values,
rj(01). We order the n members other than the chairman so that member 1 (n) is the one
with the smallest (largest) preferred value under shock 01, and r1(01)  r2(01)  ...  rn(01).
The median is the one with index (n+1)/2. When 0 = 02, all members agree and b 5 (x, x)
is their preferred point. We assume that c and a are, respectively, the preferred values of
the chairman and the median, with x  a < b < c  x. As before, we assume that at time
t the voting representative j accepts proposal x if and only if
Uj(x, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVj,t+1(x, 0k)  Uj(q, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVj,t+1(q, 0k).
This requirement, which is stricter than sequential rationality when n  3, rules out equilibria
where players accept a proposal they do not like for the simple reason that a single rejection
does not agect the voting outcome (see Baron and Kalai, 1993). The acceptance set is then
deﬁned as
At(q, 0i) = {x 5 [x, x] : |{j accepts x}|  (n+ 1)/2} .
Denote by rit a policy at time t under the shock 0i. Note that the proposal made by the
agenda setter concerns only the current period. However, in order to accept or reject the
proposal, members implicitly compare two sequences of policies, where future policies are
derived by using the proposal rules for subsequent periods.
Lemma 1. Suppose T 4. Let {er1s , er2s}Ts=t and {br1s , br2s}Ts=t be two arbitrary policy sequences
starting from an arbitrary t . The digerence between the utilities associated with these two
sequences is a monotone function of rj(01).
Proof: Without any loss of generality, suppose that the current shock is 01. Write the
expected utility associated with the sequence {er1s , er2s}Ts=t ,
Et
Ã
TX
s=t
Bs3tUj(ers, 0s)! = (er1s  rj(01))2  Bp11(er1s+1  rj(01))2  Bp21(er2s+1  b)2 + . . . ,
and with the alternative sequence {br1s , br2s}Ts=t ,
Et
Ã
TX
s=t
Bs3tUj(brs, 0s)! = (br1s  rj(01))2  Bp11(br1s+1  rj(01))2  Bp21(br2s+1  b)2 + . . . .
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Compute the derivative of the digerence of these two utilities with respect to rj(01) and note
that it does not depend on rj(01). Then, the digerence in utility among any two sequences
is monotone in rj(01). ¥
From this lemma, it follows:
Result 1. A proposal is accepted if and only if it is accepted by the median.
Since the chairman only needs the approval of the median to pass a proposal and the prefer-
ences of the other members do not matter, then a committee with n+1 members is equivalent
to a two-person committee with the chairman and the median as the only policy makers.
[21]
B Algorithm to Solve for Stationary Decision Rules
Step 1. Starting at time t = T , solve the chairman’s optimization problem for a set of
discrete nodes nj, for j = 1, 2, . . . , N in [a, c], given the shock 0 = 0i, for i = 1, 2. The nodes
nj may be interpreted as possible status quo at the beginning of period T. Given nj and 0i,
the chairman’s problem at time t = T is
VC,T (nj, 0i) =max
xM[a,c]
UC(x, 0i),
subject to the nonlinear constraint UP (x, 0i)  UP (nj, 0i). This maximization problem
is solved numerically for each nj and 0i using a hill-climbing method. The result is a
collection of 2N optimal proposal values GC,T (nj, 0i). Using these optimal values, compute
VC,T (nj, 0i) = UC(GC,T (nj, 0i), 0i) and VP,T (nj, 0i) = UP (GC,T (nj, 0i), 0i) for all nj and 0i.
Step 2. For each 0i, approximate the continuous value function VC,T (q, 0i) using a Chebyshev
polynomial of order N 1. The polynomial coecients are obtained from the Least Squares
projection of VC,T (nj, 0i) on a constant and the ﬁrst N  1 members of the Chebyshev
polynomial family. At the N nodes q = nj, the Chebyshev polynomial ﬁts VC,T (q, 0i)
exactly. For points q 6= nj, the value of VC,T (q, 0i) is computed by interpolation (i.e, by
evaluating the Chebyshev polynomial at q). For each 0i, the value function VP,T (q, 0i) is
approximated likewise.
Step 3. Move backwards one period. For each possible status quo nj and each possible
shock realization 0i, solve numerically the chairman’s problem
VC,t(nj, 0i) =max
xM[a,c]
UC(x, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVC,t+1(x, 0k),
subject to
UP (x, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVP,t+1(x, 0k)  UP (nj, 0i) + B
2X
k=1
pkiVC,t+1(nj, 0k),
where the value functions are replaced by their respective approximating polynomials. The
result is a collection of 2N optimal proposal values GC,t(nj, 0i). Using these optimal values,
compute VC,t(nj, 0i) and VP,t(nj, 0i) for all nj and 0i.
Step 4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 backwards until the chairman’s decision rules converge. ¥
[22]
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Figure 1: Monetary Policy Decisions
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Figure 2: Policy Rules for Two-State Model
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Figure 3: Stationary Policy Rules for Six-State Model
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Figure 4: Simulations
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Figure 5: Histograms
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Figure 6: Autocorrelation Functions
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Figure 7: Stationary Policy Rules when Default is Fixed
